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THE TEXTILE LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
J. WnxFmtD CREW, JR.*
The cotton textile industry was the first to come forward with
a proposed code after the passage of the National Industrial Recovery Act in May, 1933. In the public hearings on this code there
was much discussion about the problems of the "stretch-out" or
increased work load. It was stipulated in the Executive Order of
approval of the code that "until adoption of further provisions"
such as might prove necessary to prevent "any improper speeding
up of work (stretch-outs)" no employee was to be required to do
any work in excess of the practice as to the class of work of such
employee prevailing on July 1, 1933, or prior to the share-thework movement, unless such increases were approved by the code
authority and by N. R. A.' This Code of Fair Competition for
the Cotton Textile Industry was approved July 9, 1933.2
The committee appointed to investigate the problem of the
"stretch-out" or increased work load as presented at the public
hearings on the Code made its report within a few weeks after
the adoption of the Code of Fair Competition for the Cotton
Textile Industry. The committee reported that the stretch-out
system "both as a present practice and in its prospective developments" presents "a grave problem in industrial relations".
The committee recommended the creation of a national industrial relations board to assist the employer and employee to
adjust by conference the differences that might arise between the
Member of the North Carolina Bar.
'Report of the Board of Inquiry for the Cotton Textile Industry (Sept. 17,
1934) p. 2.
2 This was the first code to be adopted under the National Industrial Recovery Act passed in May, 1933.
*
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two groups. It was recommended that the national board set up
state boards where necessary.
The recommendations were in large measure adopted and
the members of the stretch-out committee were appointed to the
newly created Cotton Textile National Industrial Recovery Board.
N. R. A., upon the request of the code authority in the textile
industry, granted a twenty-five' per cent. curtailment of machine
hours for the months of June, July and August, 1934, as it was
alleged large inventories were piling up in the industry. This
curtailment of machine hours was the culminating act in a series
of events that caused a general strike to be called tentatively for
the first week in June, 1934. 3 Under the terms of a settlement
between the Union and officials of the N. R. A. the strike order
was "countermanded without prejudice to the rightn of labor to
strike".

4
5

The settlement was short-lived.

In

July the United Textile

8

Workers in Alabama called a strike. About the middle of August,
1934, the United Textile Workers of America, in convention in
New York, voted a strike in the textile industry. The Cotton
Textile National Industrial Relations Board offered its services
a Report of the Board of Inquiry for the Cotton Textile Industry, p. 4.
4 Under the terms of this settlement, 'one representative of the employees
of the cotton textile industry was to be appointed to the Labor Advisory Board
of N. R. A.. one to the Cotton Textile National Industrial Relations Board,
and one as advisor to the- Government representative on the Cotton Textile
authority; the Research and Planning Division of N. R. A. was to investigate
their report on the questions of wage increases, productive machine hours
necessary to meet normal demand, wage differentials above the minimum,
The scope of the
changes in man-hour productivity and the stretch-out.
Cotton Textile National Industrial Relations Board was to be enlarged to
make express provisions for that Board to handle all complaints of Code
violations."
GThe report of the Board of Inquiry for the Cotton Textile Industry
stated that the settlement by which the strike order was countermanded on
June 2, 1934, did not, in the opinion of the Board, go to the roots of the difficulty. The report at page 4, reads: "During the year 1933 and up to May
1934 there were few labor disturbances in the industry. All through this
period, however, there were developing the seeds which finally grew into the
present conflict. Complaints of workers centered around three main problems.
First was a growing feeling that the machinery under the code for protecting
the rights of employees guaranteed by Congress under section 7(a) and for
administering the other labor provisions of the code was proving inefficient and
inadequate, and that as a consequence workers were not obtaining their full
rights granted by the code and by the Recovery Act. A second source of
dissatisfaction was the increased work load resulting from the growing pressure upon management, due to increased labor costs, to obtain the fullest possible utilization of its labor force. The third factor in the situation was the
complaint that the hours prescribed by the code were not sufficient to secure
the reemployment intended and that weekly earnings were declining."
a This strike was not called off and was merged in the general textile strike
called for the first week in September, 1934.
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as mediator.7 The National Labor Relations Board undertook to
effect some agreement before the strike was actually called, so it
invited representatives of the Union and of the Cotton Textile
Institute to a joint conference in Washington. The Cotton Textile
7See Report of the Board of Inquiry for the Cotton Textile Industry, pp.
8 and 9: "'There is no doubt but that one of the basic causes of the present
conflict is the wide-spread dissatisfaction on the part of the labor with machinery of code administration dealing with labor's rights under the code. The
procedure for handling complaints of violation of section 7(a) and other labor
provisions of the code, as it has existed up to the strike, may be described
briefly as follows:
"The Cotton Textile National Industrial Relations Board was, as already
noted, originally conceived as a body for handling 'controversies' arising over
stretch-out problems alone. More or less as an afterthought the Board was
given jurisdiction over controversies arising out of 'any other problem of
working conditions.' In all types of cases, however, the legal power of the
Board was limited to hearing cases-on appeal from the State boards, whose
power in turn was limited to hearing cases on appeal from the mill committees.
Thus the National Board and the State board were legally equipped to act only
through the mill committee procedure, and only in case a 'controversy' arose
in the mill
"The Board was seriously handicapped in other ways. It lacked facilities
for performing its functions; it was granted no definite budget. Two of the
members were unable to devote their full time to the Board. The member of
the Board representing labor was from the printing industry and not a textile
worker. Much of the work had to be experimental. The State boards often
did not function satisfactorily and in the end several became virtually defunct.
Without in any way wishing to reflect upon the integrity or sincerity of the
members of the Board, its operations in practice under these handicaps resuited in wide-spread dissatisfaction with the Board as a part of the code
administrative machinery.
"With reference to the handling of complaints (as distinguished from 'controversies' which had gone through the mill-committee procedure) the actual
practice was as follows:
"9A complaint from an employee or a group of employees filed in any branch
of the Government was routed to the Cotton Textile National Industrial Relations Board. The Board acknowledged the complaint, enclosing a copy of the
code and a statement outlining the employee's rights with reference to the
mill-committee procedure. No further notice or report was sent to the complainant. A digest of the complaint, omitting the complainant's name, was
prepared by the Board and forwarded to the Code Authority, a body composed
entirely of textile manufacturers except for the three Government representatives without vote. The private field agents of this organization made
the investigation and reported back to the code authority. There was no
supervision by any other body. Although the complainant's name was omitted at the request of labor, the necessity for doing this is significant and the
ineffectiveness of the method is obvious.
"The principle of investigation by management of complaints made by
workers against management cannot be defended from any standpoint consistent with the principles on which the Recovery Act is founded. The principle is in fact directly contrary to usual N. R. A. procedure, as expressed in
N. R. A. regulations and enforced as to many other codes. And, as might be
expected, there is considerable evidence, both from the union and from an independent inquiry conducted by a member of the N. R. A. staff, that the investigations were often less effective than would be the ease had they been independent in character.
"Complaints of the violations of section 7(a), such as alleged discriminatory
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Institute declined to attend.8 The Union accepted the invitation.
The conferences thereafter held by the National Labor Relations
Board with each side separately failed to avert the strike which
was called for September 3, 1934.
On September 5, 1934, President Roosevelt appointed a Board
of Inquiry for the Cotton Textile Industry.9 This Board, in its
report filed September .17, 1934, recommended, among other
things, 10 the creation of a textile labor relations board. The readischarge and refusal to bargain collectively, were, handled by the same procedure. It appears to us self-evident that in no event should such complaints
be handled by a partisian body made up of employers only. The code authority
agrees to this conclusion and has already expressed its willingness to withdraw
entirely from the handling of section 7(a) complaints.
"In summing up the situation it may be said in general that the whole system of administering the labor provisions of the code has completely lost the
confidence of labor in this industry and is for that reason alone incapable of
functioning satisfactorily in the future. The Board therefore feels it necessary
that there be set up entirely new machinery for the administration of the code
insofar as it affects labor."
s The Cotton Textile Institute contended that the strike was a strike against
the code and that the union was not representative of the wishes of most of the
employees in the industry.
9 John G. Winant, Chairman, Marion Smith and Raymond V. Ingersoll constituted this Board. The Board and the report submitted by the Board are
customarily referred to as the "Winant Board", and the "Winant Report".
10 Summary of Recommendations, Report of the Board of Inquiry for the
Cotton Textile Industry, pp. 15 and 16:
(1) "For the more adequate protection of labor's rights under the collective barganing and other labor provisions of the code, there shall be created
under Public Resolution No. 44 an impartial board of three to be known as the
Textile Labor Relations Board which shall be provided with an adequate staff
and other facilities. This Board shall have powers and duties in the textile
field similar to those exercised by the National Labor Relations Board and the
Steel Labor Relations Board in their respective fields, and shall have authority
to administer, in addition to section 7(a), other labor provisions of the cotton,
silk, and wool codes.
(2) In order to obtain necessary data upon the ability of the cotton, silk,
and wool textile industries to support an equal or a greater number of employees at higher wages, it is recommended that the President direct the Department of Labor and, in accordance with section 6(c) of the Recovery Act,
the Federal Trade Commission to investigate and report on these matters at the
earliest possible time.
(3)
For the purpose of regulating the use of the stretch-out system in the
cotton, wool, and silk industries it is recommended that the respective codes
be amended to provide that a special committee be created under the Textile
Labor Relations Board to supervise the use of the stretch-out; that until February 1, 1935, no employer shall extend the work load of any employee, except in
special circumstances with the approval of the stretch-out committee; that the
stretch-out committee shall have power to investigate present work assignments
and where it finds improper speeding up of work require reduction accordingly;
that the stretch-out committee shall recommend to the President not later than
January 1, 1935, a permanent plan for regulation of the stretch-out, under
which employers shall be required to secure approval of an impartial agency
prior to increasing the work load of the employees, which plan when approved
by the President after such notice and public hearing as he may prescribe shall
become effective as part of the code.
(4) To aid in the enforcement of code provisions relating to wages above
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sons assigned for its creation are significant.Upon the basis of this report and in response to the request
contained therein, the United Textile Workers called off the strike,
and requested all of the strikers to return to their jobs on Monday
morning, September 24, 1934.
On September 26, 1934, President Roosevelt issued an execu12
tive order creating the Textile Labor Relations Board,' and in the
the minimum and to serve as an aid and guide in making collective agreements,
it is recommended that the Department of Labor be directed to study definitions and classifications of occupations and existing wages for such occupations, and that the information thus collected be made available to labor and
management of the industry.'
11 See n. 7, supra.
12 "By virtue of and pursuant to the authority vested in me under title 1 of
the National Industrial Recovery Act (Ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195, Tit. 15 U. S. C.,
Sec. 701) and under joint resolution approved June 19, 1934 (Public Res. 44.
73d Cong.), and in order to effectuate the policy of said title and the purposes
of the said joint resolution, it is hereby ordered as follows:
"See. 1. There is hereby created in connection with the Department of
Labor to be known as the 'Textile Labor Relations Board' (hereinafter referred to as "The Board") which shall be composed of the following three
'Special Commissioners': Judge Walter P. Stacy of North Carolina, Chairman; James A. Mullenbach of Illinois; and Admiral Henry A. Wiley, United
States Navy, Retired. Each special Commissioner shall receive necessary traveling and subsistence expenses and, except on such days as he receives compensation pursuant to Executive Order No. 6751, June 28, 1934, $40 per diem in
addition thereto. Two Special Commissioners shall constitute a quorum. A
vacancy in the Board shall not impair the right of the remaining special Commissioners to exercise all the powers of the Board.
"Sec. 2. The Board and/or such agencies as it may create or utilize in
aceordance with this order shall immediately investigate, hold hearings, make
findings of fact, and take appropriate action in any case in which it is alleged
that there has been discrimination in taking men back to work . after the
textile strike.
"See. 3. The Board is hereby authorized and directed, in connection with
the textile industry:
(A) To create, utilize, or exercise its powers through such regional or
special agents or agencies is it may deem necessary to carry out its functions;
and
(B) To exercise all the powers provided in Public Resolution 44, SeventyThird Congress, for a board established under said resolution; and
On its own motion or on complaint of any party affected, to investi(C)
gate, hold hearings on, and make findings of fact as to, any alleged violation
of section 7(a) of the National Industrial Recovery act and such part of any
edde of Fair Competition or agreement as incorporates said section, and, if
necessary, to refer such findings, with recommendations, to proper Governmental
agencies for appropriate action; and
(D) Upon request of the parties to a labor dispute, to act as a board of
voluntary arbitration or to appoint a person or agency for such voluntary
arbitration; and
(E) To exercise such powers as may be cohferred upon it by any Code
of Fair Competition.
"See. 4. In connection with the Codes of Fair Competition for the cotton
textile, silk textile, and wool textile industries, the Board is hereby authorized
and directed, on its own motion or on complaint of any party affected, to
investigate, hold hearings on, and make findings of fact as to, any alleged
violation of any provision of said codes relating to hours of work, rates of pay,
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same order abolished the Cotton Textile National Industrial Relations Board. Section Two of this executive order is as follows:
"The Board and/or such agencies as it may create or
utilize in accordance with this order shall immediately investigate, hold hearings, make findings of fact, and take appropriate action in any case in which it is alleged that there has
been discrimination in taking men back to work after the
textile strike."
Immediately thereafter the Textile Labor Relations Board
began to function. It was authorized, in Section 3 (c) of the
executive order creating the Board "on its own motion or on complaint of any parties affected, to investigate, hold hearings on,
and make findings of fact as to, any alleged violations of Section
7 (a) of the National Industrial Recovery Act and such part of
the new code of fair competition or agreements as incorporates
or other conditions of employment, and, if necessary, to refer such findings,
with recommendations, to proper Governmental agencies for appropriate action.
"See. 5. The Board shall certify the results of all elections conducted by it
or by its agents to parties concerned, and the person, persons, or organization
certified as the choice of the majority of those voting shall be accepted for
the purpose of collective bargaining, as the representative or representatives
of the employees eligible to participate in the election, without thereby denying
to any individual or employee or group of employees the right to present
grievances, to confer with their employers, or otherwise to associate themselves
and act for mutual aid or protection.
"See. 6. (A) Appeals on questions of law in cases involving section 7(a) of
the National Industrial Recovery Act and such part of any Code of Fair Competition or agreement as incorporates said section may be taken from the Textile Labor Relations Board to the National Labor Relations Board in which
(1) The Textile Labor Relations Board recommends review, or (2) there is a
difference of opinion in the Board, or (3) The National Labor Relations Board
deems review will serve the public interest.
(B) Whenever the Board has taken or has announced its intention to take
jurisdiction of any ease or controversy authorized by this Order, no other person or agency in the executive branch of the Government, except upon the
request of the Board or except as otherwise provided in the preceding subsection.
shall take or continue to entertain jurisdiction of such case or controversy.
Whenever the Board has made a finding of facts and such order shall (except
as otherwise provided in the preceding subsection or except as otherwise recommended by the Board) be final and not subject to review by any person or
agency in the executive branch of the Government.
"See. 7. (A) The Board, with the approval of the National Labor Relations Board and the President, shall make and prescribe such rules and rogulations as it may deem necessary for the exercise of the powers conferred in
this order.
(B) The Board shall make quarterly and annual reports through the National Labor Relations Board and the Secretary of Labor to the President. Such
reports shall state in detail cases heard, decisions rendered, investigations made,
and the names, salaries and duties of all officers and employees appointed by
it under the authority of this Order and receiving compensation directly or
indirectly from the United States.
"Sec. 8. The Bureau of Labor Statistics shall prepare a comprehensive report on the actual hours of employment, earnings and working conditions in the
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said section and. if necessary, to refer such findings, with recommendations, to proper governmental agencies for proper action.
In many instances conciliators connected with the Department of Labor attempted to learn the cause of disagreements between the employers and employees and to settle the employeremployee controversies amicably. If this method was not pursued,
or if it was unsuccessful and the Union representatives made complaint, the Textile Labor Relations Board would send Examiners 4
to conduct hearings in the various communities where the difficulties arose, or the Board would conduct hearings in Washingtextile industries. The Bureau shall also make an investigation on and a
report of the different types of work performed by the various classes of labor
in such industries, the actual wage rates paid for the various classifications
of work, and the extent to which differential wage rates apply to different
skills. In accordance with section 6(c) of the National Industrial Recovery
At, and in order to furnish a basis for determining whether wage increases
based upon reduction in hours or otherwise can, under prevailing economic
conditions, be sustained, the Federal Trade Commission shall undertake an investigation of, and report on, the labor costs, profits and investments of companies and establishments in the textile industries, and make pertinent comparisons between the facts so ascertained and the changes in wages, hours and
extent of employment or workers in such industries. In order to expedite this
inquiry, the Federal Trade Commission is directed to give it priority over any
other general investigation. The Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Federal
Trade Commission shall, at the earliest possible moment, make public the reports required by this section. Such public reports shall be so prepared that
data confidentially furnished by a particular person, corporation or establishment cannot be identified.
"Bee. 9. The Board of Inquiry for the cotton textile Industry created by
executive order No. 6840 of September 5, 1934, the Cotton Textile National
Industrial Relations Board created by section XVII of The Code of Fair Competition for the Cotton Textile Industry, as amended July 10, 1934, and the
Textile National Industrial Relations Board created by Administrative Order
of June 28, 1934, are hereby abolished.
"See. 10. (A) In order to carry out this Order, there is hereby allotted
from the funds appropriated for the purpose of the National Recovery Act by
Title II of the 'Emergency Appropriation Act, Fiscal Year 1934,' approved
June 19, 1934 (Public Res. No. 412, Seventy-Third Congress) $50,000 to the
Textile Labor Relations Board, to be expended under the direction of the Secretary of Labor. After estimates have been submitted to me, further allotments
from the same funds shall be made to the Textile Labor Relations Board to be
expended under the direction of the Secretary of Labor; to the Federal Trade
Commission; and to the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
(B) The Board (with the approval of the Secretary of Labor), the Bureau
of Labor Statistics, and the Federal Trade Commission shall have authority to
incur such financial obligations and (without regard to the Civil Service Laws,
the classification Act of 1923 as amended, or Executive Order No. 6746 of
June 21, 1934) to appoint or assign such employees as they deem necessary
for their functions and the functions of such agencies as the Board may
create or utilize in accordance with this Order."
1315 U. S. C. A. (1926) § 707 (a).
14 These examiners are usually well trained men. In North Carolina two
examiners appointed were R.H. Wettach, Professor of Law, University of North
Carolina, and W. Ney Evans, formerly of the faculty of law of the University
of North Carolina. Mr. Evans at the time of his appointment was an active
practitioner at High Point, N. C.
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ton. These hearings before the Examiners and before the Board
are rather informal in that the rules of evidence are not adhered
to strictly. Both the complainants and the respondents are allowed
to present evidence. At the conclusion of all the evidence attorneys for both sides, or some representatives if attorneys are not
available, are requested to summarize briefly their contentions.
Both sides are allowed a certain period of time, usually ten days
from the time of the hearing, to file their briefs if they care to
do so. Sometimes the Examiner, or Board requests that such briefs
be filed. The Examiner sends a transcript of the evidence, together
with the arguments of counsel and his own analysis of the facts
to the Textile Labor Relations Board. Upon all the evidence, the
arguments and briefs of counsel and the recommendations of the
Examiner, the Textile Labor Relations Board makes findings of
fact and upon the basis of these facts renders decisions.
The Textile Labor Relations Board. hereinafter referred to
as the Board, thus acts as a fact finding body and states its conclusions of law as based upon these facts. In this respect it resembles the various commissions set up by the different states 5
and the Federal Government.
As it is essential, in order that the Board have authority to
act, that the respondent mills are engaged in interstate commerce and are thus subject to the Code of Fair Competition for
the Cotton Textile Industry, it is agreed by the parties or found
as a fact at the outset of the hearing that the employer mills are
engaged in interstate commerce.
All of the decisions rendered by the Board conclude with the
statement that the employer has or has not violated Section
7 (a) of the National Industrial Recovery Act and the Code of
Fair Competition for the Cotton Textile Industry. This much
discussed Section 7 (a)' 3 reads thus:
"Every code of fair competition, agreement, and license approved, prescribed, or issued under this title shall contain the
following conditions: (1) That employees shall have the right
to organize and bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing, and shall be free from the interference,
restraint, or coercion of employers of labor, or their agents, in the
designation of such representatives or in self-organization or in
other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection; (2) That no employee and
15 See statutes of the various states creating commissions to execute the provisions of Workmen's Compensation Acts.
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no one seeking employment shall be required as a condition of
employment to join any company union or to refrain from joining,
organizing, or assisting a labor organization of his own choosing;
and (3) that employers shall comply with the maximum hours
of labor, minimum rates of pay, and other conditions of employment, approved or prescribed by the President."
The decision in the case of the United Textile Workers of
America, Local No. 2305, Complainant, and Hannah Picket Mills,
Rockingham, North Carolina, Respondent, was one of the first to
be rendered by the Board 6 . This mill did not cease operation
during the srike.
The complainants contended that fifteen union members were
discharged because of alleged participation in union activities.
The Board found that "The evidence clearly shows that the company was hostile toward the Union and that the union employees
that were discharged were known by the company or its representatives to be members of the Union. It was proved that various
statements made by the company officials and its overseers in
the mills clearly showed the active hostility of the company to
union membership and activities of its employees."
The mills, on discharging an employee would discharge all
members of the family of that employee, regardless of whether
there were any complaints against the other members of the
family. This practice was admitted by the respondent mill and
justified on the ground that this was necessary in order that
notice might be given to all the members of the family to vacate
the company house which they occupied. Five of the fifteen complainants in this case were admittedly discharged for this reason
and for no other. The Board ordered these five employees to be
reinstated in their own former positions. and all of the other complainants, with the exception of two, to be reinstated as there was
no reason given for their discharge. One of the two complainants
not ordered to be reinstated was found by the Board to be "an
agitator and trouble-maker which justified the respondent in his
discharge". This employee was not a regular worker at the mill.
The decision did not discuss what constitutes an agitator and
trouble-maker and did not show whether the charge of discrimination was dismissed on these grounds or because the employee was
10 This was case No. 2, heard by Robert H. Wettach, Professor of Law, University of North Carolina, as examiner for the Textile Labor Relations Board,
at Rockingham, N. 0. on October 13, 1934. Both the complainant a4d the
respondent were represented and presented evidence at the hearing. Decision
was rendered December 12, 1934.
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not a regular worker at the mill. The Board found that one other
of the complaining employees was discharged for reason in that,
according to uncontradicted testimony, his work was unsatisfactory.
The president of the union was discharged for breakdowns
on the slasher machine which he was running. He admifted that
he was not an expert slasher hand. The evidence showed that
he was hired originally to make sizes and that his work in that
capacity was satisfactory. The decision of the Board does not
show directly why the president of the union was changed from
a job he was qualified to operate and had operated for years to
one he was not qualified to operate. Apparently the Board recognized, this change as a subterfuge, an excuse for discharging the
president of the union, for in its decisioh it found that "The company was justified in the discharge of Byrd [president of the
union] as a slasher hand, but as an act of good faith, because he is
President of the Union and was admitted to be a law-abiding employee, the company should restore him to his former position of
making sizes or to some other position which he is qualified to
fill".
The employer groups attack this decision in that it is at
variance with the orthodox conception of master and servant. Heretofore, it has been taken for granted, generally, that employees in
textile mills are not hired for any particular period of time, but
only at will and, therefore, the employer could discharge the
employee at any time without assigning any reason for the discharge. This decision, therefore, was very gratifying to organized
labor. Its implications have not as yet been fully realized for the
decisions of the Board are not binding as precedents in State and
Federal Courts and have not been brought to the attention of the
legal profession as a whole. This decision is a boon to organized
labor. Heretofore, employers hostile to organized labor could, by
discharging all employees who were members of a labor organization, thwart the organization in its embryonic state without subjecting themselves to any legal liability.
The Lydia Cotton Mlls, 7 Clinton, South Carolina, and the
Clinton Cotton Mills, Clinton, South Carolina, which mills are
under the same management, were closed during the period of
the textile strike. On the morning after the strike the officials and
members of the union active" during the strike were refused ad"TThese cases were heard before the Textile Labor Relations Board in Washington on November 26, 1934. Final decisions were rendered December 7, 1934.
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mission to the mills and their positions were filled by others.
Several of the employees not reinstated in their jobs were evicted
from company houses. The Board found as a fact that none of the
employees were guilty of disorderly conduct during the period
of the strike. Persons not employed by the mill at the time of the
textile strike were hired after the strike to take the place of the
union leaders and the active strike members. The Board, in its decision in the case of the Lydia Cotton Mills, stated that "It was
admitted by the company that the reason for not re-employing the
complaining strikers was to give the management time to investigate their activities during the strike and that these activities
took the form of speech-making on behalf of the Union." Speechmaking and the disseminating of union propaganda are insufficient to make one an agitator or trouble-maker. The respondents
were found guilty of discrimination in their refusal to reinstate
complainants in the positions occupied by them at the time of the
textile strike and in hiring new help to fill these positions, "in
violation of section 7 (a) of the National Recovery Act and Section 8 (1)18 of the Code of Fair Competition for the Cotton Textile
Industry, and has thereby interfered, restained, and coerced employees in the exercise of their right of concerted activities for
mutual aid and protection."
The decisions in these two cases follow in general outline the
decision in the Hannah Picket Mills case. The Board ordered that
in the event of the failure of the respondent employer mills to
notify the Board on or before a specified date that it had complied with the terms of the Board's decision by reinstating the
employees in their former positions that the case would be referred
to the Compliance Division of the National Recovery Administration and to other agencies of the Federal Government for appropriate action.
Where the job performed by an employee at the time of the
strike no longer exists the Board has uniformly held that the
employee not reinstated has not been discriminated against. 19
The Board has held that where the striking employee was
18 This section begins: "Employers in the cotton textile industry shall comply with the requirements of the National Industrial Recovery Act as follows:"
The provisions are the same as contained in Section 7(a) of the National Industrial Recovery Act.
19 Southern Brighton Mills, Shannon, Georgia, Case No. 12 (March 18,
1935); Defiance Manufacturing Company, Barrowsville, Mass., Case No. 19
(an. 10, 1935); Robbins Knitting Company, High Point, N. C., Case No. 43
(March 1, 1935); Knit Products Corporation, Belmont, N. C., Case No. 442
(March 7, 1935).
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guilty of lawless violence or disorderly conduct during the time
of the strike the employer was justified in discharging him.2" The
Board has not clearly defined what constitutes lawless violence or
disorderly conduct. It held in one case2' that the employer was
justified in failing to re-employ certain of its employees who were
guilty of petty larceny. It does not appear from the decision
that tbis larceny was in any way connected with the textile strike
or in any manner affected the employer-employee relationship. It
seems to be based upon the assumption that an employer can discharge employees who thus prove themselves to be undesirable
citizens. The Board did not intimate whether such violations of
law as to justify the employer in failing to rehire the employee or
in justifying his discharge were limited to felonies and violations
involving moral turpitude, or whether they included petty misdemeanors. Under the orthodox concept of the right of the employer
to discharge an employee at will the failure of this case to define
clearly disorderly conduct would be of no significance. Under the
departure as outlined in the Hannah Picket Mill Case and the
Clinton and Lydia Cases hereinbefore referred to, the exact implication of what constitutes such disorderly conduct is most important for accusations or proof of the commission of some petty
misdemeanor, such as violation of a traffic ordinance not in any
way involving moral turpitude as that term is commonly defined,
would, ofttimes, again give an employer hostile to labor an opportunity to discharge an employee at will.
The decisions of the Board have not defined clearly the term
"lawless violence". It seems that the violence which the Board
holds as justifying the employer in discharging or failing to reinstate the employee in his former position must be violence directed
toward the management of the mills or the employees desiring to
work, or violence in some manner interfering with the operation
of the mill. 22 Where the Board found that the employees prevented, by force or threats, the employers and other employees
from entering the mill, or destroyed any of the property of the
mill, it held that this conduct justified the employer in the discharge of or in the failure to reinstate the employees thus offending. What constitutes such lawless violence seems to be a question
to be decided upon the evidence in each particular case. The
Board repeatedly has upheld the right of the employee to strike
2o Ibid.
21
22

Defiance Manufacturing Company, Barrowsville, Mass., supra n. 19.
Knit Products Corporation, Belmont, N. C., rspra n. 19.
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and to picket peacefully the employer's plant, according to the
definition of peaceful picketing that was laid down by Chief
23
Justice Taft in American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Council,
the leading case on the question of what onnstitutes peaceful
picketing.
24
The case against Rosemary Manufacturing Company presents
some very interesting questions, including a discussion as to what
extent union employees on picket duty during the strike are
vicariously responsible for the conduct of those who are not members of the union and who engaged in lawless violence, disorderly
conduct or unlawful picketing. In that case it was alleged by the
respondent mill that there were not over one hundred to one
hundred and fifty of its employees who were members of Local No.
2230, United Textile Workers of America. It was estimated that at
various times during the period of the strike between two and
three thousand people were at the same time loitering around the
entrances to the plant of Rosemary Manufacturing Company and
prevented anyone from entering. According to the testimony produced by the respondent the crowd was very boisterous and at
times menacing. No actual violence occurred, however. These
pickets who augmented the picket lines as formed by the employees
of Rosemary Manufacturing Company came from the other textile
mills in the town and from nearby towns. The Board held it did
not appear that the striking employees of Rosemary Manufacturing
Company were responsible for the existing conditions and at the
same time found that a large number of non-union employees of
Rosemary Manufacturing Company were prevented from exercising their lawful right to work because of the danger inherent
in a tense situation. The Board found that "the mere fact of membership in a central, local union is hardly sufficient, without more,
to fasten responsibility upon individuals for the conduct of a
group."
The decision cites Section 6 of the Norris-LaGuardia AntiInjunction Act 25 as pertinent and concludes its findings thus:
"Certainly the Board does not intend to condone or excuse unlawful conduct, either by individuals or by a group of
23 257

U. S. 284, 42 S. Ct. 72 (1921).

Manufacturing Company, Roanoke Rapids, N. C., Case No. 16,
heard before the Board in Washington on December 4, 21 and 22, 1934; decision rendered January 30, 1935. The Rosemary Manufacturing Company has
failed to reinstate the complainants in accordance with the decision of the Textile Labor Relations Board. The case is now pending for removal of the Blue
Eagle and prosecution by the Department of Justice.
23 29 U. S. C. A. (1926) § 106: "No officer or member of any association
24 Rosemary
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individuals. Yet the only satisfactory issue upon which to
decide this case seems to be the proof of actual participation,
authorization, or ratification of unlawful conduct by the individual complainants.
"Upon the whole record before it the Board is unable to
escape the conclusion that the striking employees of Rosemary
Manufacturing Company were confronted with a condition
not wholly of their own fashioning and beyond their control,
and that from all the evidence it does not appear that they
were remiss in their duty in dealing with it."
0
The Board in its decision of the Knit Products Corporation,
Belmont, N. C., case, cites the Rosemary case in holding that the
striking employees were not responsible for the unlawful conduct of
a mob. This case held, however, that four of the complainants were
active in the mob and "made use of its presence and the potentialities of disorder inherent in the situation to keep employees
who were reporting for work from going into the plant. Their
action in this regard so far evinces an adoption and ratification
of improper conduct as to warrant their exclusion, although there
is evidence to show the management has forgiven other employeeparticipants of conduct equally subject to criticism; and there
is a strong inference that the refusal to reinstate them was based
on the fact of their leadership of organized labor rather than their
conduct. The evidence, however, is in such balance that the Board
cannot say that their exclusion was not based on their conduct, or
that the refusal to reinstate them for that reason is not justified."
In the Rosemary Manufacturing Company case the management gave explicit instructions to its superintendents and overseers to restore first to the pay rolls after the strike those employees who had reported for work during the strike and who were
classified as loyal employees. Such action on the part of the employer has been uniformly held to constitute discrimination.
Twenty-nine of the employees of Rosemary Manufacturing
Company, according to the admission of the respondent company,
have been refused employment and have been replaced by other
workmen and the sole reason for their replacement workmen and
or organization, and no association or organization participating or interested

in a labor dispute, shall be held responsible or liable in any court of the United
States for the unlawful acts of individual officers, members, or agents, except
upon clear proof of actual participation in, or actual authorization of, such
acts, or of ratification of such acts after actual kmowledge thereof."was held
26 Case No. 42. Final decision rendered March 7, 1935. A hearing
before the Textile Labor Relations Board in Washington on January 16, 1935.
Another hearing on the issue of violence was held before W. Ney Evans, Examiner, at Charlotte, N. C., Jan. 24, 25, 1935.
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the sole reason for their replacement was that they were on the
picket lines during the time of the strike. Their jobs were filled
in many instances by helpers who had not worked for the respondent mills for periods ranging from two months to sixteen months
prior to the strike according to the testimony of the superintendent of the mill, and some of the new help, according to the complainants, had never worked in the mill before. Under the decision
in the Hannah Picket Mills case this failure to re-employ was a
clear violation of Section 7 (a) of the National Industrial Recovery Act and, in reality, the only question before the Board
was whether the method of picketing "vitiates the discrimination
inherent in the deferment" of employment and in the failure to
reinstate workers on their former jobs.
In its final decision in the Rosemary case the Board did not
discuss the question as to whether an active interest on the part
of the employer in the organization of a compamy union constituted
discrimination. In the hearings before the Board one of the overseers for the respondent company admitted on cross examination
that he had attended organization meetings of a "home union"
and invited a relative of his who lived several hundred miles away
to address the prospective nunbers of the home union at one of
the organization meetings.
The decisions in the cases of Ninety-Six Cotton Mill, Ninety-Six,
S. C., and Alexander Manufacturing Company, 27 Forest City, N.
C., brought forth vigorous protest from organized labor.
In anticipation of the strike called for September 3, 1934, a
petition was circulated and signed by a majority of the employees
of Ninety-Six Cotton Mill requesting that the employer continue
the mill in operation. It was alleged but not proved according to
the finding of the Board that the employer fostered the petition.
The petition was sent to the Governor of South Carolina with a
request for protection for the employees who desired to work. Two
hundred special deputies were sworn in to preserve order. The
mill did not close on September 3, 1934, at the beginning of the
textile strike but continued in operation during the entire strike.
On September 3, 1934, the local unit of the United Textile Workers of America telegraphed the National headquarters stating that
only thirty-five per cent. of the employees of Ninety-Six Cotton
Mill were members of the union. It received a telegraphic order to
strike. Picket lines were formed. Deputy sheriffs turned a water
27 Cases Nos. 9 and 32.
(1935).

Decisions were rendered on Jan. 30 and Jan. 31,

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1935

15

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 3 [1935], Art. 2
TEXTILE LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
hose on the pickets and drove them back ninety feet from the
gate to the mill and marked a white line beyond which the pickets
did not thereafter go. The striking employees were invited to return to work but they elected not to return until after the termination of the textile strike. Immediately after the termination of the
textile strike the striking employees reported for work on September 24 and on October 1 and they were refused employment.
During the period of the strike from September 6, 1934 to September 24, 1934, new workers were hired. No new workers however
were hired after the strike and the management stated its willingness to put all of the workers back to work as soon as jobs were
available. The Textile Labor Relations Board after stating the
findings of fact based its decision on the ground that "the complainants' strike was unsuccessful and for that reason it was not
incumbent upon the employer to reinstate the strikers in their
former positions."
The case of Alexander Manufacturing Company, Forest City,
N. C., is similar upon its facts to the case of Ninety-Six Cotton
Mill and the Board used practically the same language in deciding that the employer was not guilty of discrimination. The
decision in part reads "it is quite clear from the evidence in this
case that the strike of the union members employees of the Alexander Manufacturing Company did not prevent the operation of
the mill with a full complement of operatives after September 10,
1934, and that the objectives of the strike were not attained."
Organized labor entered a protest to these decisions and a new
hearing before the Board in Washington was granted in both
eases. Labor took the position,2 8 at the rehearing, that the success
or failure of the strike had nothing to do with the question of
violation of Section 7 (a) of the National Industrial Recovery
Act and that the sole question before the Board was whether Section 7 (a) had been violated and that the success or failure of
the strike was material only in that it might throw some light
upon the question of discrimination. The complainants contend
that if this decision is allowed to remain unaltered bloodshed and
chaos will be the order in the next general strike, for the employer
will use every force possible to see that the mill is kept in operation
during the period of the strike and will, wherever possible, secure
the aid of state militia. The employee, it is contended, will realize
the utter hopelessness of the struggle and will content himself with
28 See argument and brief of counsel for the complainants filed with the Textile Labor Relations Board, Washington, D. C.
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being controlled forever by the whims and. fancies of the employer
and if the employee should have courage to strike he will realize
the odds are against him and will use every force possible to see
that the mills are not operated during the period of the strike.
There is some merit to this contention.
The Board has held uniformly that where the mill did not
resume operation until after the textile strike and then hired new
help, if employment was given to the new help rather than to
employees who were working at the time of the strike and who
did not engage in disorderly conduct during the period of the
strike, the employer is guilty of discrimination. 29 If the employer
operated the mill during the period of the strike and hired new
employees after the strike and before the old employes were put
back to work such conduct also constituted discrimination if the
striking employees applied for their jobs after the strike before
the new help was employed. The case of Byrum Hosiery Mills,
Inc.,30 Shelby, N. C. adopts this viewpoint.
Early in 1934 several employees of Aponaug Manufacturing
Company, Kosciusko, Miss.,31 were discharged because of their
union activities. A committee from the union discussed their
grievances with the management which agreed to re-employ all
of those discharged with the exeception of four. When the discharged employees returned to work thirty-five were refused
employment instead of four. Thereafter, the management discharged, without assigning reasons therefor, practically -all of the
members of the union. On or about August 10, 1934, the union
called a strike as a protest against a practical lockout of union
employees. This strike was merged with the national textile strike
called in September, 1934. The Board found that the employer
was clearly hostile to the union and that this indiscriminate discharging of union officials without cause constituted discrimination.
The case against Robbins Knitting Mill, 3 2 High Point, N. C.,
is different from the other cases decided by the Board in that after
29 Groves Thread Company, Inc., Gastonia, N. C., Case No. 10 (Tan. 8,
1935). The hearing was conducted by W. Ney Evans, Examiner, at Gastonia
on Nov. 20, 1934.
30 Case No. 33. Final decision rendered Feb. 12, 1935.
'1 Case No. 1 (Dec. 21, 1934). The respondent employer agreed to participate in the hearing before C. H. Logan, Associate Director of the New Orleans
Regional Labor Board as the agent of the Textile Labor Relations Board at
Durant, Miss., on October 6, 1934, but later declined to do so and did not appear at the hearing. The inability of the Board to force witnesses to attend
the hearings is one of the defects of the present body.
32Case No. 43 (March 1, 1935).
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the termination of the textile strike when certain employees of
the boarding department were refused employment the other
workers in the boarding department and several workers in the
knitting department went out on another strike in protest of the
discrimination against the six employees not rehired. The Board
held that this strike was in protest against the violation of Section 7 (a) of the National Industrial Recovery Act and the Code
of Fair Competition for the Hosiery Industry and, therefore, it
was incumbent upon the management to rectify the error and reinstate the strikers. In this case the Board found that thirty of
the complainants were employed elsewhere, sixteen in the textile
industry and fourteen in other employment. Therefore, the Board
held it inadvisable to "disturb the process of reabsorption of these
people in gainful occupation" but ordered that they be put on a
preferential list and reinstated before any new help was hired.
In the Knit Products Case33 some of the former employees not
reinstated were working elsewhere at the time of the hearing before the examiner. The Board as to these complainants said "The
complainants who have secured employment since the strike showed
that they would prefer their former jobs in Knit Products Corporation to their present situations. Six of the Eight are employed in towns other than Belmont, some distance away. Because
of the nature of the evidence pertaining to their employment, and
the facts shown by it, their cases will be considered without reference to their present employment."
The other decisions rendered by the Board are decided upon
the same basis, with some minor variations, as the cases already
considered. 3 '
Knit Products Corporation, Belmont, N. C., Case No. 42 (March 7, 1935).
Case No. 3, Standard-Coosa-Thatcher Company, Piedmont, Ala. (Jan. 22,
1935). This case is unusual in that the company agreed to close the mill in the
event a majority of the employees decided to strike. A majority voted to strike
so the mill was closed. One of the union members was discharged for violating
a sign relative to non-smoking. The Board held that there was not enough
evidence to show that he had been discriminated against on account of union
activities, yet his discharge seems to be unjustified. The Board ordered an
election in this case to determine who would be the representative of the employees for the purpose of collective bargaining. At the election, under the
supervision of the Textile Labor Relations Board, 399 votes were cast for a
representative other than a member of the United Textile Workers of America,
and 303 votes were cast for the United Textile Workers of America to act as
a bargaining agent.
Case No. 4, Commander Mills, Inc., Sand Springs, Okla. (Dec. 12, 1934).
The Board found that the employer was guilty of discrimination in that two of
its employees had been discharged without sufficient reason. The reasons
assigned were that one complainant had used bad language toward a woman
employee in the mill, and that one had entered the mill out of working hours.
33

34
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The gist of the misunderstanding between the employer and
employee in all of the cases that have come before or been decided
by the Textile Labor Relations Board is that the employer maintains that he has the right to discharge an employee at will, withThe Board concluded that this was a subterfuge and that the two employees
were discharged because of their Union activities.
Case No. 7A, Duplan Silk Corporation, Hazleton, Penn. Employer found
guilty of discrimination in that the jobs of Union men not reinstated were
being filled by former employees shifted from other positions within the mill.
Case No. 7B, Duplan Silk Corporation, Wilkes-Barre, Penn. The charge of
discrimination was sustained in that non-union people were shifted to union
people's jobs, and two union workers who were reemployed were discharged for
errors in their work, which errors are "quite usual in a silk mill and which
usually called for reprimands only ....

under the circumstances the errors

made by these men were not of sufficient importance to justify their discharge. 1)
Case No. 8, Eureka Printing Company, Clifton, N. J. (Jan. 7, 1935).
Charges of discrimination were not sustained as new employees were hired during the strike but no new employees were hired since September 24, 1934.
Case No. 11, Mountain City Knitting Mills, Chattanooga, Tenn. (Dec. 27,
1934). Charges of discrimination were sustained, as an employee was rehired
after the strike and then discharged because she allegedly violated a newly
posted rule against "heckling, quarreling with, coercing and intimidation of
fellow workers." All the complainant did was to tell a relative and friend
who was an employee in the mill that she should not have signed an employment
card sent out by the company "because the company just sent those cards out
to find out how many scabs there -was."
Case No. 13, Indianapolis Bleaching Company, a subsidiary of Bemis Bag
Company, Indianapolis, Ind. (Dee. 6, 1934). This mill remained open during
the strike and hired approximately 100 new employees during that time. After
the -strike an agreement was reached providing for the return of the striking
employees to their former jobs with the exception of those proved guilty of acts
of violence during the strike. The Company failed to abide by this agreement
and failed to rehire 119 of the striking employees. The decision does not show
that any new employees were hired after the strike. It appears that this decision is contrary to the decision in the cases of the Alexander and Ninety-Six
Cotton Mills, for the plant remained in operation during the strike and the
new employees were hired during that time. This case can be distinguished,
however, on the ground that the employer agreed, after the strike, to take back
the striking employees and then failed to live up to his agreement.
Case No. 15, Saratoga-Victory Mills, Inc., Guntersville and Albertsville, Ala.
Charges of discrimination were not sustained as the mills operated during the
strike. The management offered, on September 6, 1934, to rehire all of the
workers who desired to work and the employers- since the strike have not hired
any new employees and have agreed to reinstate former employees as soon as
business warrants.
Case No. 18, Acme Finishing Company, Providence, R. I. (Jan. 23, 1935).
During the hearing before the examiner the company agreed to reemploy the
union members and the union withdrew its complaint.
Case No. 20, Wakefield Textile Company, Inc., Wakefield, R. I. (Jan. 30,
1935). The charge of discrimination was sustained in that three new workers
were hired after the textile strike in the places of employees who were on the
company's pay rolls prior to the strike. These three new employees were
ordered replaced by employees working at the time of the strike.
Case No. 29, Worth Spinning Company, Stony Point, N. C. (Jan. 16, 1935).
The charge of discrimination was sustained in that after the strike the employers said that employment, until business improved, would be given ex-
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out assigning any cause therefor. As an employee is generally
hired for no fixed period of time, under the orthodox concept he
is an employee at will and thus may be discharged at will. There
would be some merit to this contention were it not for the underlying economic conditions that called forth the creation of the
National Industrial Recovery Act, the relaxation of stringent provisions of the anti-trust laws and the encouraging of employers
and employees to regulate industry by mutual agreement rather
than by governmental interference. These matters must be taken
into consideration in determining what does constitute discrimination in violation of Section 7 (a) of the National Industrial Reelusively to those employees who had stood by the company during the strike.
After the strike the company changed its system of operation from the division
of available work between two shifts comprising 128 workers to one shift comprising 72 workers. The Board apparently reached the view that this change
in method of employment was a subterfuge. Practically the same subterfuge
was employed in the case of Robbins Knitting Mill.
Case No. 47, Alabama Mills, Inc., Winfield, Ala. (Jan. 10, 1935). This ease
was decided against the employees in that the Board held that the members
of the union were bound by a prior agreement with the company to the effect
that the two complainants would not be worked in the future because of the
negligence of one complianant and the disorderly conduct of the other.
Cases Nos. 48 and 49, Enterprise Manufacturing Company and Sibley Manufacturing Company, Augusta, Ga. (March 15, 1935). In these cases the Board
held that the employers were guilty of discrimination in that in each case they
refused to reinstate employees who had been on strike and who reported for
work after the strike and before their jobs were again in operation.
Case No. 50, Globe Cotton Mills, Augusta Ga. (March 15, 1935). The charge
of discrimination was sustained as after the strike many new employees were
hired and the striking employees were not rehired.
Case No. 51, John P. King Manufacturing Company, Augusta, Ga. (March
15, 1935). It was held that the employer was not guilty of discrimination in
failing to rehire the striking employees for their places had been filled during
the strike before the striking employees reported back to work. The company
did refuse to treat with a committee representing employees, however, and this
was held to constitute infraction of Section 7(a).
Case No. 56, Cyril Johnson Woolen Mills, Stafford Springs, Conn. (March 1,
1935). The findings of fact in this case were as follows: "Under its general
powers of mediation and conciliation, the Textile Labor Relations Board has
endeavored to assist in composing certain differences that have arisen between
Cyril Johnson Woolen Mills of Stafford Springs, Connecticut, and certain of
its employees who are members of Local Union No. 2035 of the United Textile
Workers of America.
"The differences in question have led to a strike by certain employees of
the Company who are members of Local Union No. 2035 of the United Textile
Workers of America. The Board has used its best efforts to effect a conciliation between the parties to the end that the strike could be terminated, but
regrets that its efforts have thus far not been successful.
"In the absence of an allegation or proof of the violation of Section 7(a)
of the National Industrial Recovery Act, and the Code for Fair Competition of
the Woolen Textile Industry, which does not appear in this case, the Board
does not have jurisdiction leyond mediation and conciliation.
" 'These findings are made at the instance of both parties.' "
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covery Act. Before there could be any "bargaining" between
capital and labor it was necessary that the bargaining parties be
put on terms of equality, for the term "freedom of contract" or
freedom to bargain is meaningless between a wealthy corporation
on the one hand and an impoverished textile worker on the
other. Therefore, in order to place the employer and employee in
equally advantageous positions for the purpose of bargaining,
it was necessary that workers be permitted to join together for
the purpose of collective bargaining and for mutual aid and protection. This declaration of policy is clearly expressed in Section
1 of Senate Bill No. 1958,", commonly referred to as the Wagner
Labor Bill, which reads:
"Equality of bargaining power between employers and employees is not attained when the organization of employers in the
corporate and other forms of ownership association is not balanced
by the free exercise by employees of the right to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing."
If the employer is given the right to discharge the employee
without cause the purpose of the National Industrial Recovery
Act would be thwarted in a large measure, and the employer
would be given an increasingly greater advantage. The employer's
assertion of his right to discharge an employee at will is unassailable under the concept prevalent at the time of the National Industrial Recovery Act. The declaration of policy as contained
in Section 7 (a), however, changes this in its entirety. The decisions narrow down in each particular ease to a question of
whether the employer intended to discharge the employee because of union membership or whether he was discharged for
some other reason. The Board seems to intimate that an employee
can be discharged for any reason other than union activities, providing that it is in good faith. When the Board finds an employer
guilty of discrimination by failing to reinstate old employees and
hiring new employees to take the places of those thus discharged,
the Board has ruled that the employer must discharge the new
employees and take back the former employees on the jobs performed by them previously.
The employer contends that when the employee goes out on
strike he thereby forfeits all right of any kind to the job held
by him prior to the strike and that the employee hired during
35, Organized labor is unreservedly supporting this bill.
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the strike to take the place of the striking employee has a superior
right to that of the striking employee.
The right to strike and the right to picket the employer's
mill during the strike, providing the picketing is peaceful, is
generally recognized. The right to picket implies that the employer-employee relationship has not been terminated for a nonemployee is not allowed to picket. It is only the employee who
has the right to picket the employer's property during the strike.
If at the termination of the strike the employee decides that
he cannot accept his former position under th6 terms and conditions of employment existing at the beginning of the strike and
elects to seek employment elsewhere and desires not to return to
his former work, then the employer-employee relationship ceases
and new help hired after that date would have a right to the job
superior to that of the employee who elected not to return to
work The employee contends that when he goes out on strike he
Jias evidenced an intent to leave his job for a temporary period
of time only and with the intent to return to that job at some later
time when the grievances between the employer and employee
have been adjusted. An analogy is drawn from the law of personal
property in that the owner of personal property who abandons the
same temporarily or lays the same aside with the intent to use it
again at some subsequent date does not lose all of the interest that
he had in the property, but may reclaim the same at will and
his right to the property will be superior to that of one who uses
it during the period of temporary non-use. Labor contends that
Section 7 (a) protects labor in its right to bargain collectively
and if, in order to accomplish a legitimate purpose, a strike is
called then the law in guaranteeing the right to bargain collectively protects the employee in the interim.
In the decisions rendered by the Board there has been no
discussion as to whether the textile strike called for September 3,
1934, was justified.
The contention on the part of labor that the employee has
some kind of a right or equity in his job superior to that of an
employee who operated his job during the time of the strike is
startling to those who think in orthodox terms. If one becomes
reconciled to the decision in the Hannah Picket Mill case in which
it was held that an employer did not, under Section 7 (a) of the
National Industrial Recovery Act, have the right to displace at
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will an employee, he has but to take another step forward to the
position that the employee has a right or equity of some kind
in his job. Under our present social system all of the rights or
equities have been on the side of the employer who had control
over and the management of certain tangible, physical realty and
personalty. If the employer has acquired through the use of his
contributions in capital certain rights and equities in the mill he
controls, then the party on the other side of the fulcrum in the
meantime has acquired, by his labor, certain rights which should
be recognized. Apparently there was some thought similar to this
in the minds of those who drafted Section 1 (a) of the National
Industrial Recovery Act in encouraging collective bargaining,
for collective bargaining would be a nullity unless the bargaining
parties were on an equal basis at the time of the bargaining.
It is doubtful that any court at the present time would go
as far as labor in its contention relative to the right or equity in
a job. Rights of the employer, commonly called property rights,
have been given first place in our legal system and in our philosophy of government. One of the chief reasons for this is that it requires much less effort to make articulate and, by the mastery of
dialectics, explain or justify the concept of a right in or equity in a
tangible object that can be seen or experienced with the physical
senses than it is to make articulate and clearly define intangible
personal rights.
One of labor's chief causes of dissatisfaction with the Textile
Labor Relations Board is that after it has rendered a decision the
Board has no practical imeans of enforcing it. The Board may ask
the N. R. A. for removal of the Blue Eagle, but this means very
little to the employer unless he is receiving Government contracts,
for the Government will not let a contract to a manufacturer who
has lost the Blue Eagle.
The National Labor Relations Board filed a report of its
activities for the six months period ending January 9, 1935. Section 7 of this report dealing with the enforcement of the decisions
of the National Labor Relations Board iL pertinent to the enforcement of the decisions of the Textile Labor Relations Board, as both
have in effect the same power in their respective fields. This report of enforcement of decisions of the Board is in part as follows:
"The Board is powerless to enforce its own decisions. In
the ultimate analysis its 'findings' and 'orders' are nothing
more than recommendations. If they are not followed, the
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Board sends its recommendations to the N. R.A. for removal
of the Blue Eagle, and/or to the Attorney General for appropriate action. Under the present practice the N. R. A. Compliance Division gives the employer five days to show cause
why his Blue Eagle should not be removed. In a number of
cases, where the particular employer would feel the loss of
the Blue Eagle, the actual removal of the Blue Eagle has
been temporarily restrained by injunction proceedings in the
Supreme Court of the District of Columbia. In many industries, however, the loss of the Blue Eagle has little practical
effect.
"Court enforcement under the present machinery is slow,
uncertain and cumbersome. The proceeding may be by bill
in equity to force the employer to bargain collectively, or indictment for violation of Section 7 (a) as embodied in the
particular code under which he may be operating. The record
before the Board serves as nothing more than the basis for
the Attorney General to proceed. It cannot be filed or used
in court, and the case must be tried de novo. After a bill in
equity is filed the employer has thirty days in which to
answer, or he may move to dismiss, or for a bill of particulars.
The case cannot, necessarily, be tried at once. As it must be
brought in the district in which the defendant resides, or
where, if a corporation, it is incorporated, there is often the
burden and inconvenience of bringing witnesses from a distance".
The recalcitrant employer who is hostile to organized labor
and does not desire to carry out the decisions of the' Board realizes
these defects in the enforcement of the decisions of the Board and
is taking advantage of them in not obeying the decisions. The decisions of the Textile Labor Relations Board are of little practical
effect in formulating or defining a uniform body of administrative
interpretation and practice with respect to the rights of the employee. It has performed its greatest service in bringing to the
attention of the public,, through the numerous investigations and
hearings held before the Examiner and before the Board, the conditions in the textile industry as a whole and the means some
employers have adopted in order to thwart at every stage the
development of organized labor in order that the employer might
be free to carry out his own selfish desires. The creation of the
Board has for this reason been justified.
The reports of the hearings and the decisions rendered by the
Board contain documentary evidence that will be of inestimable
value to the student of social relations and to legislators attempt-
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ing to formulate policies for the benefit of the working man.
Labor hopes that through legislative acts or otherwise it will be
decided that the employee has some right or equity in his job. If
labor is givn the right to bargain collectively and if the employer
is actually required to bargain collectively, then terms and conditions of employment can be decided upon, which collective agreements can be so arranged as to, by contract, give the employee
during the term of that contract, a definite right in the job operated by him. This is the hope of labor in advocating laws guaranteeing the right to bargain collectively. Very little progress, however, has been made in these collective bargaining agreements.
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